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On what counts as a translation
ALFREDO ROQUE FREIRE1
Abstract: In this article, instead of taking a particular method as translation,
we ask: what does one expect to do with a translation? The answer to this
question will reveal, though, that none of the first order methods are capa-
ble of fully represent the required transference of ontological commitments.
Lastly, we will show that this view on translation enlarge considerably the
scope of translatable, and, therefore, ontologically comparable theories.
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1 Relativity of translation
Some fundamental indeterminacies in largely used philosophical concepts
were introduced by Quine in his well-known articles Two Dogmas of Em-
piricism (TD) (Quine, 2000) andOntological Relativity (ORel) (Quine, 1968)
and in the book Word and Object (WObj) (Quine, Churchland, & Føllesdal,
2013). In the first, he makes a resounding critique of the traditional distinc-
tion between synthetic and analytic sentences; from this, he concentrates
on asserting the indeterminacy of translations between any two languages
in the radical translation experiment (WObj). In the second, he shows that
the absence of distinction, together with the indeterminacy of the models
in Löwenheim-Skolem’s theorem, implies the inscrutability of the reference
relation. Thus, every reference relation is fundamentally linked to the choice
of a background theory for which the existential requirements of the theory
are interpreted.
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If, in TD and WObj, Quine describes the indeterminacy of the transla-
tions at the epistemological level, in ORel he relativizes the ontology of a
theory to a translation in the background theory: “Specifying the universe
of a theory makes sense only relative to some background theory, and only
relative to some choice of a manual of translation of the one theory into the
other” (Quine, 1968). Offering an ontology to a theory, therefore, amounts
to reducing a theory in a background theory. The translations are, for Quine,
underdetermined by any empirical experiment, but not by a kind of relativ-
ity.
Quine used the notion of model-theoretic reduction between first-order
theories to show the relativity of the reference relation. But the reduction
itself would not be subject to the same kind of relativity. If the translation
relation has a constitutive defect, then it would be contextual - but not un-
derdetermined. According to Quine, the translation relationship could be
reconstructed from the syntactic feature he termed “proxy function”. Non-
relativity, in this case, is linked to the understanding that translations are
not properly objects, that such functions “need not exist as an object in the
universe even of a background theory”(Quine, 1968). To take such an exit,
however, is as much restricted on the scope of translations as it is invariably
interpreted with respect to the mechanisms performed by the background
theory. It is restricted because translations not only occur between a back-
ground theory and an object theory, but also between two unfamiliar theories
to the underlying theory. It is interpreted because a first-order theory is not
able to capture the claim that a given set of formulas represent-the-T -theory.
It is only possible to understand what was done by the background theory
as a translation if we interpret the result outside the scope of the background
theory. If PA is internalized in ZFC, this means that (1) for each formula of
PA’s language, there exists a set in ZFC that represents the formula of PA,
(2) for each sequence of PA’s formulas exists a set representing the sequence
of PA’s formulas and finally (3) that if a sequence represents a PA’s proof,
then ZFC proves that the set representing the sequence satisfies a definable
property in ZFC. All these statements are not statements of ZFC, but of a
metatheory that establishes the bond between the two theories. From the
ZFC’s point of view, one simply proves theorems about certain sets, and the
statement that these proofs speak about PA must be interpreted in another
metatheory. When Gödel does the internalization of arithmetic in arithmetic
itself, he does not assume to be internalizing properly the arithmetic; rather,
it is only possible to understand the internalization from the theorem of the
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representation which is done in primitive recursive Arithmetic (ARP). Even-
tually, this means that the relationship of internalization only makes sense
if we consider a third theory seeing the two arithmetics. Something similar
occurs in the case of ZFC interpreting PA: we must take into account at least
one ARP that is responsible for establishing that the representation of PA in
ZFC is a representation of PA - otherwise, it is not possible to understand in
this procedure more than ZFC proving interesting theorems.
More generally, we reinforce the idea that any translation relationship
between theories can only be understood in a third theory. This means that
the case in which we seemingly reduced a theory T in a background theory
Tm is, in fact, the evaluation of the relationship between T and Tm in a third
theory TM and the reduction provided by Gödel allows us no more than to
say that Tm and TM can be syntactically the same.
This issue becomes even more evident if we consider the environment of
independence proofs in set theory. When, by abbreviation and convenience,
we call the Gödel’s constructibles L a model for ZFC, we do no more than
actually state that there is an interpretation (Shoenfield, 1967, p. 57 - 61)
between the two theories. In this case, it is not possible to do a complete
internalization in the same sense applied in the cases already mentioned. If,
in the earlier cases, internalization would provide us with a truth predicate
for the internalized theory, the same is not valid for these set theories - if
consistent, none of them is capable of internalizing one truth predicate into
the other. Notably, the background theory (ARP) for the interpretation is not
able to offer an ontology even relative for set theories, and yet it is able to
speak about the "translation" between them.
The question still remains open: (QEx) who asserts that the syntactic
resources stated in the third theory are a translation relation? Indeed, this
seems a new question of representation, in a sense similar to that of the
question in the case of reduction, although more serious. As Boghossian
(1996) recalls, Quine himself in TD examines two distinct types of analyt-
icity: the first in which the substitution of synonymous terms for forming
logical truths is based on the synonymy between a term T and a term T’
introduced by definition; and the second in which the basis is a synonymous
relation intuited by a competent speaker. In the first case, the relation of syn-
onymy is trivial and of little influence in Quine’s critic, whereas the second
one is the focus of harsh criticisms. Indeed, QEx is a question whose answer
suffers from the same problems as the empiricist dogmas. If we want to an-
alyze translations so that they do not suffer from such criticisms, we must
deny them the status of a question capable of expressing meaning and - (1)
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assume that the two theories analyzed in the translation were defined in the
context of the background theory TB and (2) assume that “being a transla-
tion” is a theoretically defined element in TB . To assume (1) is excessively
convenient, though hardly problematic; to assume (2) is artificial. Let’s look
at these two hypotheses in more detail.
The analysis of the assumption (1) starts with the question of what it
means to take a given theory as a metatheory or background theory. That
question is not frequently raised because it is obvious or by negligence.
When, for example, we study the relationship of satisfaction in ZFC, through
model theory, we do much more than using ZFC as the background theory.
Before even evaluating the satisfaction of a T theory, one must internalize
T ’s syntax into ZFC; and the fact that this internalization represents T is a
statement from another background theory. The notion that an internalized
theory “is a theory” must be a ZFC predicate whose (2’) representability is
guaranteed in a similar fashion to the assumption (2). Even if, again, we take
the assumption (2’) as unproblematic, we would have to admit that it is not
possible to understand a theory that was not internalized in the first place.
This means that if an agent A1 has TM as background theory and a second
A2 agent presents a theory Tx unknown by A1, then A1 cannot offer any
understanding about Tx, since he or she could not present a representation
predicate “this internalization represents Tx”2.
Let us assume problem (1) as solved and proceed with the question
pointed out in supposition (2). As we have seen, the translation must be
defined as a predicate in a background theory that establishes by theorem
the link between two theories. This necessity imposes precisely what Quine
wanted to avoid concerning translations, i.e. that they were objects. In this
case, it is relatively simple to show that what counts as a translation is rela-
tive to the choice of a meta-metatheory. Consider, for instance, the case of
interpretation between PA and ZF without the axiom of infinity and with the
addition of the negation of the axiom of infinity (ZF−Inf ). Explicitly, this
result can be described as a proof in ARP that if ThT (α) is the predicate
internalized in the ARP that states that α is theorem of theory T and being
2This problem of representation is not easily solved without extrapolating the first-order
environment. I endorse, in this sense, the thesis defended by Freire (2017) that the identity of a
mathematical theory is not a formal system, but a normativity instituted by the practice. In the
case of a purely formal theory such as the Tx, I add that its identity is instituted in practice with
formal systems. This movement toward normativity allows the communication between agents
to be the exchange of information at the normative level and the representation of Tx for A1 is
given by the same relation that A1 already has with the theories of A1’s known scope.
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I the interpretation of PA into ZF−Inf , then
ARP ` ∀α ∈ LPA(ThPA(α)→ ThZF−Inf (αI)) (1)
We take an undecidable formula δ of PA. If an ARP model (in this case,
relativized to the meta-metatheory) satisfies ThPA(δ), then the number rep-
resenting the proof must be a non-standard number. Therefore, it is possible
to build an ARP model such that ThPA(δ) is true, while δ is false - say this
model is M. Notably, for M, the formula αI is true in ZF−Inf and, at
the same time, it is a translation of the formula α of PA. Still, the model
sees this same formula as false. Then we come across the strange situation
in which a false formula is translated into a true formula. In this case, the
interpretation I does not count as a translation relative to the choice of M.
Even so, one could insist on contextualization, stating that the translation
of a theory T1 into another theory T2 makes sense only when the ontology
is fixed for each of the theories. That is, we would think the translation
between two theories in the context in which all their sentences were decided
by the stipulation of the models M1 and M2. Although we take this as an
error in establishing priority, we will consider it for the moment. In the
article Satisfaction is not absolute, Hamkins and Yang (2014) show that two
models for ZFC can agree on what the standard model for PA is, and still
disagree on which formulas the standard model satisfies. This means that
the decision on meta-metatheory can determine the truth value of certain
formulas of the model of T1 or T2. If, therefore, we translate a formula with
this property into another theory, we would not know if we should map it to
a true or false sentence in the other theory until we fix the meta-metatheory.
Thus, even if the context of the background theory is fixed as a condition for
the translation, it is still underdetermined in relation to the meta-metatheory.
But, as stated, the problem is rather one of priority. Offering an ontology
to a theory is more complex than offering a translation between two theo-
ries - evidence for this is the fact that one can speak much of the translation
between two theories without having to touch the subject of an ontology.
The ontology for a theory is the answer to the question “what does the the-
ory commit to?”, While translation is the answer to the question “how can
one theory offer an understanding for the commitment of another theory?”.
We can have a more understandable and consensual answer to the question
“what is the translation of unicorn in Japanese?” before we have an answer
to the question “are there unicorns?” - and to say that the answer to the first
depends on the response to the second seems unreasonable.
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Therefore, translations are relations between two theories established
in a third theory. And a theoretical environment must be responsible for
asserting that the mapping in question preserves what one wants to preserve.
Because of that, as we have seen, the relativity of translation takes effect.
Accepting this thesis, however, is not possible in Quine’s program, since a
significant part of this relies on the concept of ontological reduction.
2 Translation Idealized
One way to restore the treatment of the philosophy of mathematics and
physics after the attack on meaning is to attribute legitimacy to the onto-
logical reductions between theories. It is for this reason that Quine empha-
sizes the treatment of ontological reductions. However, we have shown that
translations are also subject to the same kind of relativity as the notion of
meaning. I understand that Quine himself would impose a limit on his rela-
tivism if he came to that conclusion. Despite this, I am still sympathetic to
his inquiries - though not to his conclusions. Therefore, we review Quine’s
implications for meaning, analyticity, and, by extension, for translations.
In On what there is(Quine, 1948), Quine establishes the concept of on-
tological commitment of first-order theories. We would be committed to the
existence of entities capable of assuming the role of the bound variables in
the axioms, making them true. Further on, in ORel, Quine shows that we
are unable to present a determinate ontology to the criterion of ontological
commitment in an absolute sense, and so we are forced to speak of ontology
in a relative sense. Notably, Quine first asks about what "existence must
accomplish" and then shows that we can only relatively accomplish such a
requirement. However, for him, the same does not occur with the concept of
translation: translations are simply defined as a tool that preserves truth and
boolean structure in a very particular way. It is therefore necessary to rekin-
dle the question of what counts as a translation by introducing the question:
"What should a translation do?" Or "What does someone who performs a
translation expect to do?"
To properly formulate this question, we correlate with the question about
existence. If, in the case of existence, we want to know what the statement
of the theory requires it to exist, in the case of translation we want to replace
the language in such a way that the requirement of existence is preserved.
So we start from the definition: With a translation of a theory T1 into another
theory T2 it is expected that what T1 is committed to exist be transferred
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to what T2 is committed to exist.
With this definition, we want to emphasize that the relation between the
concept of translation and the mappings we carry out in the first order theo-
ries is the relation of formalization. Much of what is observed in the litera-
ture of the subject is the assumption that translations carry out the transport
of existential requirements and the assertion of translation between two the-
ories guarantees the reducibility of one ontology into the other. We consider
this an error - an exaggerated transparency as to what it may or may not
count as a translation. We now turn to a more accurate analysis on what this
question can offer us.
We will take a step back, trying to understand what would possibly be an
ideal translation. We do not want to establish a methodology that obtains
ideal relations of translation, but to affirm some necessary (not sufficient)
properties so that a method can imply a translation in its maximum sense.
Nor do we want to say that this is a translation to be sought, on the con-
trary, we want to use this abstract experiment to reinforce a subtle problem,
namely, that satisfying what is desired with an idealized translation is not at
all trivial.
Initially and (in my view) without prejudice, we consider a rather simpli-
fied conceptual scheme, in which the defined names and descriptions have
only reference relations to objects in the world. We will avoid the problem
of the radical translation pointed out in TD and WOb, assuming the exis-
tence of an ideal mediator (IM). Quine showed that it is necessary for two
speakers to have equivalent linguistic/conceptual structures so that they can
establish any effective communication about a translation between the the-
ories used by each of them. This IM is able to understand both languages
that one wants to translate. In this case, she will be responsible for ensuring
that speakers actually refer to the same objects when they, in fact, perform
a correct defined description that replaces the description used by another
speaker in their own language. Assuming the IM as our mediator, we avoid
the epistemological problem and focus on what is ideally a translation3.
An important aspect that makes this type of translation possible is: we
are assuming as fixed the object of the references. At least in principle,
there is a non-linguistic way of accessing object, either by sight, hearing,
3In view of these considerations, it seems possible to establish a translation between two
speakers of two different languages. When one of them, A, refers to an object by a defined
description a1, the other speaker, B, could, by trial and error, finally hit the equivalent defined
description b1 in its own language. Ideally, A and B could begin to seek more complex levels
of language until an effective translation is established.
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touch or any indirect way of capturing that same information. If a speaker
describes “the stone”, we can see, hear or touch that referent. In the case of
a description of the type “the mayor of the city”, identifying this referent can
occur through obtuse and complex ways; if one of the languages does not
have a single predicate that is equivalent to “being a mayor”, one could still
use a predicate like “head of X”. The reference of “head of X” still depends
on the concept of “citizens of Y” and this concept must be translated in a
progressive nesting of attempts and errors until an effective translation can
be reached.
Indeed, we have dealt only with the formulas that have a reference to
ensure understanding. However, this does not include all cases of transla-
tion, we can, as we well do, translate sentences that have no referents, as the
sentence “the king of France is bald”. Although we take it simply as false,
we cannot say that this sentence has no translation in another language. We
can say that the translation preserves the sense of Frege or the positivist’s
method of verification; independently of this, the sentence, although without
reference, has a "potential reference" and this must be preserved. If France
is to have a king again and this king is bald, the sentence in both languages
must cease to have false truth-value or “ be meaningless ” and become true.
This does not mean a denial of Quine’s holism of meaning - in fact, it is
perfectly acceptable to admit that, rather than simply accepting that the sen-
tence becomes true, another theoretical assumption is reviewed. It is enough
that both speakers are sensitive to the truth-value change of the proposition
in question. And if it is the case that this change entails the understanding
(through IM) that the speakers are not using the same referent, then this will
adjust in the next iterations with IM.
It is not the case that the simple mapping of the formulas with refer-
ence must preserve the truth-value, this only guarantees that the translation
"works" for the particular experiential universe that the speakers live in the
moment. In order for there to be a translation in the strongest sense, it is
necessary (and reasonable) that languages preserve translation even if real-
ity changes or if there is any new discovery of the sciences. Therefore, the
ideal translation must be able to fix the reference relations, the arrows that
link the names to the objects.
We have considered only theories that make direct reference to objects
of the world. There is much controversy whether such theories would even
be possible. We assume as possible only as an abstract experiment. This will
not influence the discussion, since ultimately we want to talk about theories
that do not make direct reference as theories of the first order.
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The ideal translation between two theories of direct reference T1 and T2
should be a mapping between the formulas of T2 in T1 such that the existen-
tial requirement of a formula of T2 is the same as the existential requirement
of the correspondent in T1. In the case of theories that do not make direct
reference, the picture changes. The terms of the theory do not point directly
to the world, but only require that those objects captured by the quantifiers
satisfy a certain set of properties. In these cases, we no longer require that
a translated sentence point to the same object as the original sentence - it is
only necessary that the collection of objects pointed out by both theories be
isomorphic.
A first order theory does not fix the references, but just how each object
captured by the quantifiers relates to each other 4. That is why, when we
speak of first order theories, we affirm reference relations to collections of
objects “under isomorphism”. In order to have a soundness criterion for
the translation, we need to have a criterion to say that the theories refer to
the “same” object as we had with the IM. Given a possible reference model
R1 for the theory T1 and R2 for the theory T2, then the reference r1 of a
defined description dtrans(T1) is the same as the reference r2 of the original
description d in T2 if, and only if, r1 relates to all other objects translated
into R1 in the same way as r2 relates to all other objects of R2.
Yet, why, in the case of theories that do not fix the reference, should we
maintain that translation preserves meaning? Given a defined description
d(x), we can not know if the description has a reference until the theory
proves that ∃xd(x). However, even if we do not know whether this is the
case or not, the translation must be able to establish this "transfer of existen-
tial requirement". Indeed, some first-order theories are decidable, and for
this reason there is a procedure that determines whether or not the predicate
refers. For cases of translation between decidable theories, it is arguably
valid to assume that the translation need not focus on fixing the reference
relations, but only that all descriptions are mapped isomorphically. How-
ever, this is not valid in any case, if a theory is incomplete, there are de-
scriptions d(x) we cannot know whether they have reference or not - in this
case, we must preserve the existential requirement in the same way that we
must preserve the translation for the "king of France" even though he does
not exist at the moment. Nevertheless, we now stop talking about “fixing
the reference relation” and we proceed to say that the translation must “fix
4The article In defense of a dogma (Grice & Strawson, 1956) emphasizes this aspect criti-
cizing Quine’s TD.
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the reference relation in an isomorphic context”.
In order to be able to assert an "equality of meaning" criterion inde-
pendent of the models fixed for the theories, it would be necessary for the
descriptions dTrans(T1) and d to have the same reference for any two mod-
els R1 and R2 of T1 and T2. This criterion, however, cannot be applyed
unrestricted as we have argued in the last section. Thus it does not seem, at
least in principle, possible to establish an ideal translation between any two
theories.
As we have seen, the fundamental characteristic of a translation is to
transfer existential requirements. That is, it should occur at the level of
the reference arrows, rather than occur at the level of the formulas. At the
level of the formulas we hope to formalize an apparatus capable of fixing
the desired transfer to the level of the reference arrows. If all relations of
reference to objects of one theory can be converted into relations of refer-
ence to objects of another theory, we could say that the second manages to
capture every ontological import of the other theory and thus manages to
preserve the existential requirements of the first theory. We call this trans-
fer of existential requirements: ideal translation. However, dealing directly
with the idea of translation is to return to the same problem of fixing the
intended model for a theory, since the relation of reference presupposes the
two points of the arrow relation fixed: formulas and objects of the model.
2.1 Conditions for Idealization
What is traditionally called translation is a mappingMap between formulas
of a theory T1 into formulas of another theory T2 which (i) preserves some
properties of the translated theory and, mainly, (ii) guarantees the result
of relative consistency between the theories (if T2 is consistent, then T1
is consistent). We consider, in line with tradition, that a proof of relative
consistency is strongly linked to the concept of translation. However, if
we want to talk about the idea of ideal translation, we must minimize our
expectations by stating that a mapping implies a (partial or total) aspect of
the ideal translation.
This way of dealing with a concept puts us back on the floor and al-
lows us to speak significantly of concepts such as translation, analyticity and
meaning. To recover these concepts as idealizations is, at the same time, to
recover the normative use of the dichotomy that they impose and to preserve
the idea that we cannot perfectly fulfill their requirements. It is to recognize,
then, that I can admit that there are no analytic sentences and at the same
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time say that philosophical and scientific activity are fundamentally differ-
ent, because of the normative dichotomy imposed by the analytization or
not of concepts. Indeed, there would be no fundamental difference between
any sentence of a philosopher and of a scientist – all being subject to em-
pirical revision – but there would be a fundamental difference in attitude to
each sentence. On the concept of “bachelor”, one prefers to argue about the
sentence “bachelors are generally younger than married men” and the other
prefers to discuss whether “bachelors are unmarried ” – and we all know
who is one and who is the other.
It is not, though, allowed to any concept C the possibility of idealization.
It is necessary (1) that there may be good reasons to say that certain X’s are
more C than other Y’s; and (2) that the context in which the comparison is
done is subject to less relativity than the context of the statement of C. In
fact, a large portion of philosophical concepts can be justified precisely in
this way, and the idea of inscrutability of meaning and analyticity is simply
the result of the nonobservance that ultimately any philosophical concept
would be subject to a greater or less degree of inscrutability. If there are no
good reasons for a α or β sentence to be ideally analytical, there are good
reasons to say that α∨β is more analytic than α and also that β; if there is no
good reason to say that the extensional meaning of a sentence is measured by
Tarski’s semantics, there are good reasons to say that other options are bad;
if, finally, there are good reasons to say that interpretations fail to capture
everything a translation should accomplish, there is good reason to say that
interpretations do this better than the simple mapping of true sentences into
true sentences5.
It is from this argument that we recover the translation: although there
is no mapping between formulas of a language in formulas of another lan-
guage that completely transfers the existential requirements of a theory in
the first language to the existential requirements of a theory in the other
language, there are still reasons to understand certain methods as captur-
ing aspects of translation neglected by other methods. This, on the other
hand, makes us liberalize what counts as “translation”. Any mapping that
in some sense transfers ontological commitments between two theories can
count as a translation. The point here is the observation that certain reduc-
tions do not count as a complete transport from one ontology to another, and
a more accurate analysis on how this imperfection contaminates the analy-
5Benacerraf (1965) stresses a view, related to this argument, that I find inspiring. For him,
although numbers are not sets, it does not mean that taking them as such is worthless: this
strategy “cast some sobering light on what it is to be an individual number”.
11
Alfredo Roque Freire
sis of ontologies is necessary. If, however, we suppose that interpretations
are the only legitimate method of translation, then the case in which neither
of the two theories interprets the other would be intractable; in this case,
the liberalization of what counts as a translation can offer ways to compare
ontologies where it was not possible.
3 The sense of translation in a proof of relative consistency
What should we preserve in the mapping between the formulas of two the-
ories so that it is possible to affirm that there is a transfer of existential re-
quirements? One possible answer to this question is simply to state that all
the true formulas of a theory must be mapped into true formulas of another
theory. This results from the observation that the opposite seems absurd: if
“2+2 = 4” is taken to be a false sentence of any theory, then no translation
occured. However, the very notion ‘true formulas’ is subject to indetermina-
tion. Do we take as “true” all the formulas that are true in some model? We
take as “true” the formulas that are true in an intended model? We take as
“true” only formulas that are theorems of a theory? It is at least reasonable
to admit that “2 + 2 = 4” is translated into a formula that one know is not
false. It is also acceptable to admit that “2 + 2 = 4” is translated into a true
formula in the “intended model”, as it is to be translated into a theorem.
We suppose, provisionally, that all theorems of a T1 must be mapped in
theorems of a T2. As well noted by the tradition in the subject, a mapping
that imposes only this restriction is too flexible: suffice, for example, that
all the theorems of T1 in some theorem of T2 have been mapped. However,
by imposing the condition that if α is mapped to β, then ¬α is mapped to
¬β - we are able to perform some ontological analysis. The case where T1
is inconsistent no longer supports such a mapping in a consistent theory T2.
Notably, this means that an inconsistent theory is ontologically irreducible
to a consistent theory. In fact, an inconsistent theory commits itself to the
existence of any object, whereas a consistent theory is only committed to
the existence of a particular universe of objects.
Other types of requirements can be imposed for mappings so that we can
affirm closer links between ontologies. We can impose the preservation of
the boolean structure, as we can impose that existential quantifications are
maintained existential quantifications. Each of these constraints has a role
in effecting the transfer of ontological commitment, and in general we will
say that the sum of all these constraints results in the mapping method.
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In particular, a mapping method frequently used in the study of onto-
logical reductions: relative consistency proofs (RCP). By the first order
completeness theorem, we know that the consistency of a theory implies
an ontology. For this reason, the proof that the consistency of a theory T1
implies the consistency of a theory T2 is a good reason to assume that the
ontology of T2 is reducible to the ontology of T1. However, as we saw in the
previous sections, this is not enough to affirm the reduction. In this case, we
will call the the sense of translation of a RCP what counts as transference
of ontological commitment in this RCP.
3.1 The general scheme for translation
Interpretations impose excessive restrictions on what counts as a translation.
This method requires that each α formula of a T1 theory be interpreted as a
unique formula αI in T2’s language. The procedure for determining αI is
1. Regular: predicates, constants, and functions of T1 are interpreted by
predicates, constants, and functions definable in T2.
2. Uniform: predicates, constants, and functions are always interpreted
in the same way, regardless of where or how they occur in the T1
formulas.
3. Universally regular: interpreted quantifiers are quantifiers limited by
a single predicate in T2.
In the treatment of natural languages, we are accustomed to make trans-
lations in which the context weighs substantially on the process that gen-
erates the translated sentence. Indeed, the case where the exact words of
the dictionary substituted in one sentence form a sentence in the other lan-
guage with the desired meaning is of a special type and is usually associated
with rather simple constructions of both languages. However, in formal
languages the requirement for uniformity seems more natural, though not
necessary: it is not at all strange to suppose a translation of the relation of
membership which means something when we speak of “sets of one kind”
and another when we speak of “sets of another kind”.
A Similar argument can be used to deny the necessity of universal reg-
ularity. It is possible to imagine that the context of the quantifiers changes
according to the sentence that one wishes to translate. The predicate that
defines the universe of interpretation could be variable according to the for-
mulas being analyzed. Of course, it is necessary that this universe alternates
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in an ordered way, maintaining the necessary cohesion so that the RCP is
possibly obtained. However, nothing in principle prevents the universe of
interpretation from varying with context.
Therefore, to create a flexible notion of interpretation, we start with the
analysis of two antagonistic forces: make the conditions (2) and (3) more
flexible, while maintaining a version of the theorem of interpretation in such
a way that it still implies relative consistency.
The interpretation theorem states that if all the axioms of a theory T1
are interpreted in theorems of a theory T2, then all the theorems of T1 are
interpreted in the theorems of T2. This means that the interpretation pre-
serves the logical structure of the arguments in T1. Similarly, we expect a
flexible version to satisfy: If T2 sees as true each axiom of T1 brought by
the mapping into a universe comprehensible to T2, then the same holds
for any theorem of T1.
We convert this condition into symbolic language using the following
notation: αTr(T2) denotes "α brought into the comprehensible universe of
T2"; and `s denotes “seeing as true” in some compatible fashion to the
definition of Tr(T2).
It follows, therefore, in a symbolic language the general scheme of in-
terpretation: given two theories T1 and T2 and being that, for every axiom
αi of T1, T2 `s αTr(T2)i , then T1 ` α⇒ T2 `s αTr(T2).
Finally, in order to obtain the RCP, it is enough to impose on the `s and
Tr(T2) the following condition: if T2 `s αTr(T2) ∧ ¬αTr(T2), then there is
a formula β in T2 such that T2 ` β ∧ ¬β.
A method that satisfies these conditions presents a great claim for trans-
ferring existential commitments. However, it is still necessary to answer
whether or not there is a method that satisfies those requirements other than
the method of interpretation itself. In fact, it is possible in this scheme to
capture the RCP in which the assumption of the existence of a model for a
theory implies the existence of a model for another theory6. However, this
demonstration goes beyond the scope of this paper and will be presented in
an upcoming article.
6Many of the relative consistency proofs by model-theory are reducible to proofs by inter-
pretations. But this is not unrestricted. An example for this is Novak’s proof of equiconsistency
between NBG and ZFC.
14
On what counts as a translation
4 Final remark
In this article, we have insisted in Quine’s strategy in ORel to show that
not only ontology is relative, but the ontological reduction itself is relative.
Nonetheless, instead of denying the meaningfulness of the use of the ex-
pression “the translation”, we take the concept as a normative idealization.
This approach allows us to come up with a more comprehensive plurality
of translation methods – each of them having some (always partial) sense
of translation. Eventually, as a result of this view, we may achieve some
ontological comparison where it was not possible. This picture, thus, com-
prises the understanding that more than one method can count as partially
transferring the existential requirements.
References
Benacerraf, P. (1965). What numbers could not be. The Philosophical
Review, 74(1), 47–73.
Boghossian, P. A. (1996). Analyticity reconsidered. Noûs, 30(3), 360–391.
Freire, R. A. (2017). Interpretation and truth in set theory. (preprint)
Grice, H. P., & Strawson, P. F. (1956). In defense of a dogma. Philosophical
Review, 65(2).
Hamkins, J. D., & Yang, R. (2014). Satisfaction is not absolute.
to appear in the Review of Symbolic Logic, 1–34. Retrieved from
http://jdh.hamkins.org/satisfaction-is-not-absolute
Putnam, H. (1962). The analytic and the synthetic. In Putnam 1975 (p. 215-
227).
Quine, W. V. (1948). On what there is. The Review of Metaphysics, 2(1),
21–38.
Quine, W. V. (1968). Ontological relativity. the Journal of Philosophy,
65(7), 185–212.
Quine, W. V. (2000). Two dogmas of empiricism. Perspectives in the
Philosophy of Language, 189–210.
Quine, W. V., Churchland, P. S., & Føllesdal, D. (2013). Word and object.
MIT press.
Shoenfield, J. R. (1967). Mathematical logic (Vol. 21). Addison-Wesley
Reading.
Alfredo Roque Freire
15
Alfredo Roque Freire
State University of Campinas, Institute of Philosophy
Brazil
E-mail: alfrfreire@gmail.com
16
